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Defusing a Ticking Time Bomb:
The Complicated Considerations Underlying
Compulsory Human Genetic Editing
by GRANT HAYES FRAZIER*
Abstract
Gene editing is a type of genetic engineering that enables scientists to
change an organism’s DNA by adding, removing, or altering genetic
material at particular locations in the human genome. While these editing
technologies are in their infancy, they hold great promise for future
applications. They also raise many moral, ethical, and legal questions.
Fast forward 10 years. In utero gene editing is effective, safe, and
inexpensive (or covered by insurance). A couple with strong religious
views against gene editing decides to procreate despite knowing, via family
history, they are both homozygous dominant for the allele that causes
Huntington’s disease (an autosomal dominant disease), and therefore the
child will have a 100% likelihood of inheriting the disease (barring a highly
unlikely, unforeseen mutation eliminating the inherited disorder). The
couple undergoes genetic testing of the fetus, which confirms the fetus is
homozygous dominant for Huntington’s disease. The couple’s physician
recommends a gene editing treatment to “fix” the fetus’s genes. The
couple declines the treatment on religious grounds, knowing full well the
spectrum of health risks and symptoms their child will face. The child is
born with Huntington’s disease and suffers the expected health issues. Safe
post-birth gene therapy for Huntington’s is not available.
In a situation like the one above, what liability do parents face if there
is a state statute requiring gene editing in circumstances such as these? If
there is no such statute, should courts determine that parents have an
affirmative duty, via existing common law principles governing “special
relationships,” to acquiesce to these procedures during pregnancy to avoid
almost certain postnatal injury? If so, what genetic issues are important
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enough for this affirmative duty to be imposed? What criminal liability do
parents potentially face under existing causes of action? What types of
civil actions might the affected child bring against his or her parent(s)?
Does the state or the child even have the standing to bring a suit? If the
standing requirement is met, how might courts reconcile parents’ potential
affirmative duty to acquiesce to gene editing treatment with parents’
constitutionally-based arguments in opposition (e.g., free exercise of
religion, privacy rights under Roe v. Wade and its progeny, etc.)? These
questions, and related topics, are addressed below.
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Introduction
Curing a presently irremediable genetic-related disease by “fixing” a
“bad gene” might seem like science fiction. However, a group of
developing technologies, known as gene editing, enable scientists to change
and, therefore, fix an organism’s DNA by adding, removing, or altering
genetic material at particular locations in the human genome.1
Collectively, these technologies have the potential to be one of the most
significant medical advances in recent history.2 Experts have suggested
1. What Are Genome Editing and CRISPR-Cas9?, GENETICS HOME REFERENCE (Apr.
11, 2018), https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/genomicresearch/genomeediting; see also How Is
Genome Editing Used?, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. INST. (Aug. 3, 2017), https://www.geno
me.gov/27569224/how-is-genome-editing-used/.
2. Victor Tangermann, A CRISPR Future, FUTURISM (Jan. 30, 2018), https://futur
ism.com/crispr-genetic-engineering-change-world/. Gene-editing has many other potential
applications, including the repair of old or damaged organs. No Pig in A Poke, ECONOMIST
(Oct. 17, 2015), https://www.economist.com/news/science-and-technology/21674493-gen
ome-engineering-may-help-make-porcine-organs-suitable-use-people-no-pig. This technology
could save many lives, with an average of 20 people dying each day in the U.S. waiting for
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these editing tools may have clinical utility for treating afflictions such as
Huntington’s disease,3 sickle cell disease, cystic fibrosis, hemophilia,
mental illness, heart disease, HIV/AIDS, and several types of cancer.4
While these editing tools are in their infancy, research and
development efforts have been accelerated by significant financial
commitments from well-respected private sector investors.5 Recent
developments indicate these technologies hold great promise for future
applications,6 and several experts have noted that these technologies’
efficacy is rapidly progressing and clinical use is likely not far off.7
Beyond its clinical benefits, gene editing holds great promise for
halting and reversing the trajectory of skyrocketing medical costs8 by
enabling proactive treatment addressing the root afflictions that cause

viable organ transplants. Organ Donation Statistics, ORGAN DONOR, https://www.
organdonor.gov/statistics-stories/statistics.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2018).
3. See Su Yang et al., CRISPR/Cas9-Mediated Gene Editing Ameliorates
Neurotoxicity in Mouse Model of Huntington’s Disease, 127 J. CLIN. INVEST. 2719, 2719
(2017); see also CRISPR Reverses Huntington’s Disease in Mice, GEN (June 20, 2017),
https://www.genengnews.com/gen-news-highlights/crispr-reverses-huntingtons-disease-inmice/81254532.
4. What Are Genome Editing and CRISPR-Cas9, supra note 1; see also Edward
Lanphier, Don’t Edit the Human Germ Line, 519 NATURE NEWS 410, 410–11 (2015).
5. In 2015, a group of investors including Bill Gates, Google Ventures, Deerfield
Management, Viking Global Investors, and T. Rowe Price Associates participated in a $120
million funding round for Editas, a small company focused on CRISPR gene-editing.
Matthew Herper, Bill Gates and 13 Other Investors Pour $120 Million into Revolutionary
Gene-Editing Startup, FORBES (Aug. 10, 2015, 7:30 AM), https://www.forbes. com/sites/
matthewherper/2015/08/10/bill-gates-and-13-other-investors-pour-120-million-into-revolut
ionary-gene-editing-startup/#15996f886369.
6. See, e.g., Jocelyn Kaiser, A Human Has Been Injected with Gene-Editing Tools to
Cure His Disabling Disease, SCIENCE (Nov. 15, 2016, 6:00 PM), http://www.
sciencemag.org/news/2017/11/human-has-been-injected-gene-editing-tools-cure-his-disabl
ing-disease-here-s-what-you (reporting that the first instance of in vivo gene editing was
carried out in November 2017 to treat a 44-year-old man with Hunter’s Syndrome - a severe
inherited metabolic disorder); see also James Gallagher, DNA Surgery on Embryos Removes
Disease, BBC (Sept. 28, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/health-41386849 (reporting that
for the first time, Chinese scientists, in September 2017, corrected a gene mutation in a
human embryo for the inherited blood disorder beta thalassemia).
7. Jacqueline Howards, Scientists Edit Gene for Blood Disease in Human Embryos,
CNN (Sept. 29, 2017, 3:30 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/09/29/health/gene-edit-betathalassemia-study.
8. David Cutler, JAMA Forum: Rising Medical Costs Mean More Rough Times
Ahead, NEWS@JAMA (June 23, 2017), https://newsatjama.jama.com/2017/06/23/jamaforum-rising-medical-costs-mean-more-rough-times-ahead/.
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prolonged medical problems.9 Some experts estimate that effective gene
editing treatments would “save society hundreds of billions of dollars in
health care costs every year.”10 New editing tools, like CRISPR, are
making the editing process quicker, more precise, and less expensive.11
Despite gene editing’s many potential positives, it also raises moral,
ethical, safety, and legal questions, as it can be used for less ethicallyagreeable, therapeutic means, such as enhancing human traits or
characteristics.12
Fast-forward 10 years. In utero gene editing is effective, safe,
inexpensive and, perhaps, covered by insurance.13 A couple with strong
religious views against gene editing decides to procreate despite knowing,
via family history, they are both homozygous dominant14 for the allele that
9. Thom Patterson, Unproven Medical Technique Could Save Countless Lives,
Billions of Dollars, CNN (Oct. 30, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/30/health/pioneerscrispr-dna-genome-editing/index.html.
10. Id.
11. Amy Dockser Marcus, DIY Gene Editing: Fast, Cheap—and Worrisome, WALL
ST. J. (Feb. 26, 2017, 11:00 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2015/10/30/health/pioneers-crisprdna-genome-editing/index.html.
12. See, e.g., What Are the Ethical Concerns About Genome Editing?, NAT’L HUM.
GENOME RES. INST. (Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.genome.gov/27569225/what-are-theethical-concerns-about-genome-editing/ (discussing intelligence, height, or athletic ability as
examples of non-therapeutic uses). Some argue there are safer alternatives than in utero
gene editing, namely preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) and in vitro fertilization
(IVF). Lanphier, supra note 4, at 410-11. PGD and IVF enable scientists to create multiple
embryos in a lab, genetically test them, select one that has a “normal” genetic makeup, and
implant that embryo into the would-be mother’s uterus. Id. However, in utero gene editing
addresses certain issues that PGD and IVF cannot— including when both parents are
homozygous (have two copies) for a disease-causing variant, when the disorder is
polygenetic (influenced by more than one gene), and for families who have moral, ethical,
or religious objections to the PGD/IVF process. Id.
13. While not a subject of this paper, there are concerns gene editing will not be
covered by medical insurance and, therefore, won’t be affordable by many. Jason Koebler,
One Thing that Could Stop the Rise of Gene Editing: Insurance Companies, MOTHERBOARD
(Apr. 12, 2016, 9:10 AM), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/gv5vm9/will-insura
nce-companies-cover-crispr-therapies-gene-editing.
14. Because the Huntington’s disease trait is autosomal dominant, only one parent
would need to be homozygous dominant (DD) for the Huntington’s disease trait to be
passed on to all offspring, regardless of the status of the other partner. Huntington Disease,
GENETICS HOME REFERENCE, http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/condition/huntington-disease#inh
eritance (last visited Apr. 11, 2018). The mutant allele (DD) would expressively dominate
the normal allele (dd) in 100% of progeny receiving it (DD x dd = Dd, Dd, Dd, Dd). See
Ivan Suarez Robles, Interactive Punnet[t] Square, HOPES HUNTINGTON’S DISEASE INFO.
(March 8, 2015), http://www.web.stanford.edu/group/hopes/cgi-bin/hopes_test/interactivepunnet-square/. It would not require that both parents be homozygous dominant or that one
be heterozygous dominant. If both were heterozygous dominant (Dd), the offspring (Dd X
Dd = DD, Dd, Dd, dd) would have a one in four chance of being homozygous dominant for
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causes Huntington’s disease15 (an autosomal dominant disease), and
therefore the child will have a 99% likelihood of inheriting the disease.16
The couple undergoes genetic testing of the fetus, which confirms the fetus
is homozygous dominant for Huntington’s disease. The couple’s physician
recommends a gene editing treatment to “fix” the fetus’s genes. The
couple declines the treatment on religious grounds, knowing full well the
spectrum of health risks and symptoms their child will face. The child is
born with Huntington’s disease and suffers the expected health issues. Safe
post-birth gene therapy for Huntington’s is not available.
What liability do parents face if there is a state statute requiring gene
editing in circumstances such as outlined above (hereafter collectively
referred to as the “Hypothetical”)? If there is no such statute, should courts
determine that parents have an affirmative duty, via existing common law
principles governing “special relationships,” to acquiesce to these
procedures during pregnancy to avoid almost certain postnatal injury? If
so, what genetic issues are important enough for this affirmative duty to be
imposed? What criminal liability do parents potentially face under existing
causes of action? What civil actions might the affected child bring against
his or her parent(s)? Does the state or the child have standing to bring a
suit? If the standing requirement is met, how might courts reconcile the
parents’ affirmative duty to acquiesce to gene editing treatment with the
parents’ constitutionally-based arguments in opposition (e.g., free exercise
of religion, privacy rights under Roe v. Wade and its progeny, etc.)? These
questions, and related topics, are addressed below.

Scientific Background
To better understand the topics to be covered, an overview of human
genetics and gene editing is useful.

the trait, two in four chance of being heterozygous dominant for the trait, and a one in four
chance of being homozygous recessive and not carrying the trait. Id.
15. Huntington’s disease is characterized by degeneration of nerve cells in the brain.
Symptom manifests during an affected individual’s 30s and 40s and includes a breadth of
motor, cognitive, and behavioral declines. Mayo Clinic Staff, Huntington’s Disease, MAYO
CLINIC (June 13, 2017), https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/huntingtonsdisease/symptoms-causes/syc-20356117.
16. Homozygous dominant individuals are rare and experience more severe symptoms
than heterozygous individuals. Ferdinando Squitieri et al., Homozygosity for CAG Mutation
in Huntington Disease Is Associated with a More Severe Clinical Course, 126 BRAIN 946,
946 (2003).
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A. Human Genetics
An individual’s DNA sequence acts as his or her blueprint for growth,
expressed characteristics, and functions.17 DNA consists of two strands of
uniquely ordered nucleotides held together by four types of nitrogenous bases:
cytosine (C), guanine (G), adenine (A), and thymine (T).18 These bases pair
together - C with G, and A with T— and allow DNA to maintain its well-known
double helix form.19

Figure 1. DNA Base Pairs and Structure.

Stretches of these nucleotides comprise genes. There are several types
of genes.20 Some genes that encode messenger RNA (mRNA) code for
proteins, 21 while many other non-coding genes specify other types of RNA
(e.g., transfer RNA or ribosomal RNA, among many others) that are

17. What Is DNA?, GENETICS HOME REFERENCE, https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/basics/
dna (last updated Nov. 28, 2017).
18. Id.
19. Nucleotides and Bases, GENETICS GENERATION, http://knowgenetics.org/nucle
otides-and-bases/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2018).
20. Michele Clamp et al., Distinguishing Protein-Coding and Noncoding Genes in the
Human Genome, 104 PNAS 19428, 19428 (2007) (“The twofold challenge is to ensure that
the [human gene] catalog includes all valid protein-coding genes and excludes putative
entries that are not valid protein-coding genes”).
21. What Is a Gene?, GENETICS HOME REFERENCE (Nov. 28, 2017), https://ghr.nlm
.nih.gov/primer/basics/gene.
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involved in the translation of mRNA into proteins and a variety of other
regulatory functions.22
Three base sequences in the DNA that code for proteins, comprised of
amino acids, is called codons.23 There are 64 possible combinations of the
four nucleotide bases into three base sequences.24 Three of these possible
combinations code for stop codons, which terminate translation.25 The
remaining 61 combinations code for the 20 amino acids that normally
constitute proteins.26 Of these amino acids, three have six codons, two
have single codons, one has three codons, and the rest have either two or
four codons.27
Even a slight variation in a gene’s coding can change the gene’s
function by changing the normally coded-for protein.28

22. Suzanne Clancy & William Brown, Translation: DNA to mRNA to Protein,
NATURE, http://www.nature.com/scitable/topicpage/translation-dna-to-mrna-to-protein-393
(last visited Apr. 12, 2018).
23. Protein Structure, NATURE, http://www.nature.com/scitable/topicpage/proteinstructure-14122136 (last visited Apr. 12, 2018); see also Ann P. Smith, Nucleic Acids to
Amino Acids, NATURE, http://nature.com/scitable/topicpage/nucleic-acids-to-amino-acidsdna-specifies-935 (last visited Apr. 12, 2018).
24. JEREMY M. BERG ET AL., BIOCHEMISTRY 7 (5th ed. 2002).
25. The Information in DNA Determines Cellular Function via Translation, NATURE,
http://www.nature.com/scitable/topicpage/the-information-in-dna-determines-cellular-func
tion-6523228 (last visited Apr. 12, 2018).
26. Id.
27. See Codon, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://britannica.com/science/codon (last
visited April 12, 2018).
28. Gene Expression, NATURE, https://www.nature.com/scitable/topicpage/geneexpression-14121669 (last visited Apr. 11, 2018). However, it is important to note that the
effect a slight variation has on the gene’s function is dependent upon several factors
including (1) the type of change; (2) whether it occurs in the coding or in the non-coding
components implicated in regulating gene expression; and (3) if the variation occurs in part
of the coding component, where the variation occurred. See DNA Is Constantly Changing
Through the Process of Mutation, NATURE, http://www.nature.com/scitable/topicpage/dnais-constantly-changing-through-the-process-6524898 (last visited Apr. 11, 2018).
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Figure 2. Three Mechanisms of Gene Mutation.
Figure 2 shows the three main ways DNA-copying mechanisms can
malfunction and miscopy a gene—by either adding, deleting, or
substituting one or more nitrogenous bases.29 However, it is important to
note that not every mutation changes a gene’s expression.30 It is possible
for DNA to mutate at a single nucleotide and still code the same amino acid
with no effect, which is referred to as a “silent mutation.”31
B. Gene Editing
Gene editing seeks to use either somatic or germline therapy32 to
silence or correct these “mistakes.”33 Both therapies are currently carried
out using one of three main families of engineered nucleases:34 (1) zinc

29.
30.

DNA Is Constantly Changing Through the Process of Mutation, supra note 28.
Do All Gene Mutations Affect Health and Development?, GENETICS HOME
REFERENCE (Sept. 25, 2018), http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/mutationsandisorders/neutral
mutations.
31. DNA Is Constantly Changing Through the Process of Mutation, supra note 28.
32. How Is Genome Editing Used?, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. INST. (Aug. 3, 2017)
https://www.genome.gov/27569224/how-is-genome-editing-used. Somatic therapy targets
non-reproductive cells, and, therefore, only affects the patient receiving the gene therapy
(not potential progeny). Id. Germline therapies involve editing in reproductive cells (ex:
eggs and sperm), with changes likely to be passed down to subsequent generations. Id.
This raises more ethical and moral challenges than somatic gene editing. Id.
33. See How Does Genome Editing Work?, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. INST. (Aug. 3,
2017), https://www.genome.gov/27569223/how-does-genome-editing-work/.
34. There is a fourth common family of engineered nucleases, Rapid Trait
Development System (RTDS). See Noel J. Sauer et al., Oligonucleotide-Directed
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finger nucleases (ZFNs), (2) transcription activator-like effector-based
nucleases (TALENs), and (3) the clustered regularly interspaced short
palindromic repeats (CRISPR).35
1. Zinc-finger Nucleases (ZFNs)
ZFNs are a type of DNA-binding protein that facilitates gene editing by
creating breaks in DNA’s double-helix structure at targeted locations.36
The cell tries to repair a break by either nonhomologous end joining37 or
homology-directed repair.38 Using ZFN’s, scientists are able to insert labcreated DNA fragments into DNA gaps before the homology-directed
repair mechanism of the cell provides its own patch of DNA to fill the
gap.39 This will, at least, theoretically alter the gene expression back to
“normal.”
While ZFNs recently made national headlines for the technology’s use
in the first U.S.-based in-patient gene editing trial,40 the use of ZFNs
remains limited because they are expensive41 and difficult to design, engineer,
and construct.42 Furthermore, a new ZFN needs to be engineered for each

Mutagenesis for Precision Gene Editing, 14 PLANT BIOTECHNOLOGY J. 496, 496 (2016).
However, this genome editing technology is currently used exclusively in plants and yeast.
Id. As such, it is not relevant to the hypothetical proposed in this article.
35. Thomas Gaj et al., ZFN, TALEN, and CRISPR/Cas-Based Methods for Genome
Engineering, 31 TRENDS BIOTECHNOLOGY 397, 398–402 (2013).
36. How Does Genome Editing Work?, supra note 33.
37. “Nonhomologous end joining” occurs when the cell takes the two ends of the DNA
strand that has been broken, and seals them together. Dana Carroll, Genome Engineering
with Targetable Nucleases, 83 ANN. REV. BIOCHEMISTRY 409, 420–21 (2014). This can
cause frame shifts, consequently causing alterations to the DNA code and protein. TERENCE
A. BROWN, GENOMES § 14.1.1 (2d ed. 2002), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/
NBK21114/.
38. Homology-directed repair is where a cell tries to repair a DNA break by filling in
the gap with a copy of the original sequence. Carroll, supra note 37, at 420–21.
39. Id. at 412–14; see also Cherie L. Ramirez et al., Engineered Zinc Finger Nickases
Induce Homology-Directed Repair with Reduced Mutagenic Effects, 40 NUCLEIC ACIDS RES.
5560, 5560 (2012).
40. Marilynn Marchione, 2nd Man Undergoes Gene Editing; No Major Side Effects
Showing So Far, N.J. HERALD (Feb. 8, 2018, 12:01 AM), http://www.njherald.com/
20180208/2nd-man-undergoes-gene-editing—-no-major-side-effects-showing-so-far.
41. Rozina Sabur, First Gene-Editing Attempted in Human Body to Cure Disease, THE
TELEGRAPH (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/11/16/first-geneediting-attempted-human-body-cure-disease/ (“Zinc finger nucleases are an older and more
expensive tool for gene editing than CRISPR genome editing.”).
42. NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. INST., supra note 33.
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DNA target sequence, decreasing likelihood ZFNs could be scaled up for
mass use.43
2. Transcription Activator-like Effector Nucleases (TALENs)
TALENs are similar to ZFNs in that both technologies are engineered
from naturally occurring proteins capable of binding to specified DNA
segments.44 Specifically, TALENs are nucleases built from arrays of 33-34
amino acid modules that have a strong recognition of specific nucleotides.45
These modules can be customized to target almost any DNA sequence (and
therefore gene mutation).46 The TALEN cuts the targeted DNA sequence,
which induces the cell’s repair mechanisms of either non-homologous end
joining or homology-directed repair.47 TALENs have the added benefit of
being easier and less expensive to engineer than ZFNs.48
3. Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats (CRISPR)
System
CRISPR-Cas9 (“CRISPR”) is the most recently developed high-profile
gene-editing technology. CRISPR was adapted from a gene editing system
that naturally occurs in bacteria.49 This system seizes fragments of DNA
from invading viruses and uses these fragments to create DNA segments
known as “CRISPR arrays.”50 If the original (or similar) virus attacks again, the
CRISPR arrays enable the bacteria to recognize the virus and respond by

producing RNA segments that use the Cas9 enzyme (or similar)51 to target

43. Jeffrey M. Perkel, Genome Editing with CRISPRs, TALENs and ZRNs,
BIOCOMPARE (Aug. 27, 2013), http://www.biocompare.com/Editorial-Articles/144186Genome-Editing-with-CRISPRs-TALENs-and-ZFNs/.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See supra notes 37 and 38 and accompanying text; see also Carroll, supra note 37,
at 410–11.
48. Perkel, supra note 43.
49. Eric S. Lander, The Heroes of CRISPR, 164 CELL 18, 18–22 (2016).
50. Id. at 22.
51. A new nuclease has been identified for use with the CRISPR-Cas13 enzyme. Ruth
Williams, RNA Editing Possible with CRISPR-Cas13, THE SCIENTIST (Oct. 25, 2017),
https://www.the-scientist.com/?articles.view/articleNo/50719/title/RNA-Editing-Possiblewith-CRISPR-Cas13/.
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and cut the virus’s DNA (thereby disabling it).52 In essence, CRISPR acts
as the bacteria’s immune system, killing the invading virus.53
CRISPR-Cas9 works similarly in the lab, where scientists create a short
“guide” RNA sequence that binds to a determined DNA target sequence
and to the Cas9 enzyme.54 The resulting RNA is used to recognize the
targeted DNA sequence, which the Cas9 enzyme then cuts.55 After the
DNA is cut, researchers utilize the cell’s own DNA repair mechanisms to
add or delete segments of genetic material. This is done either (1) by
utilizing the cell’s response of non-homologous end joining to silence
problem genes by inserting or deleting genetic material during the repair
process,56 or (2) by using homology-directed repair to insert a lab-created
DNA sequence into the void.57

Figure 3. Gene Editing Overview.

CRISPR technology has been praised for being less expensive, more
accurate, and more efficient than other gene editing methods.58 CRISPR’s
benefits include ease of customization and its abilities to simultaneously
target multiple genes and cut DNA strands on its own (whereas other gene
editing techniques require separate cleaving enzymes to do this).59
CRISPR’s increased efficiency is evidenced by a study that found CRISPR

52. Id.
53. Lander, supra note 49, at 18.
54. Carroll, supra note 37, at 416.
55. Id. While Cas9 is the most commonly used enzyme for this process, other
enzymes are also used. What Are Genome Editing and CRISPR-Cas9?, supra note 1.
56. Carroll, supra note 37, at 415-16.
57. See id. During this process, the cell typically inserts free-floating genetic material
into the void created by the enzyme cut. Id.
58. Questions and Answers About CRISPR, BROAD INST., https://www.broad
institute.org/what-broad/areas-focus/project-spotlight/questions-and-answers-about-crispr
(last visited Nov. 20, 2017).
59. Id.
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is six times more efficient than TALENs or ZFNs in creating targeted gene
mutations.60

Legal Principles
With a better technical understanding of how gene editing works, we
now turn to the relevant legal principles and considerations. The parents in
our Hypothetical may face both criminal and civil liability61 depending
upon (1) whether the child or state has sufficient standing to bring a case
against the parents, (2) whether a statute exists that requires gene editing in
certain instances, (3) whether a court finds (in the absence of such a statute)
the parents had an affirmative duty of care to the child, and (4) if such a
duty exists, that the affirmative duty was sufficient to require the parents to
acquiesce to gene editing.
This paper will focus on duty and breach, with a brief discussion of
causation62 and damages within a civil context. The following sections that
follow focus on current criminal causes of action that the state might bring
against parents, and civil causes of action comparable to those a child
might try to bring against his or her parents.
A. Does the Child or State Have Standing to Bring Suit?
Before addressing the viability of civil or criminal causes of action, the
party bringing suit against the parents—the child or the State—must first

60. Gaurav K. Varshney et al., High-Throughput Gene Targeting and Phenotyping in
Zebrafish Using CRISPR/Cas9, 25 GENOME RES. 1030, 1030 (2015).
61. While far more cases address parents’ criminal liability for breaching an
affirmative duty owed to their children, the dearth of civil cases does not mean that currently
existing legal principles do not support civil liability. Vincent R. Johnson & Claire G.
Hargrove, The Tort Duty of Parents to Protect Minor Children, 51 VILL. L. REV. 311, 317–
19 (2006).
62. Causation is not covered in depth as the technology implicated in a case like the
one proposed in the Hypothetical has yet to be developed. What we know is that the
evidence of causation will be heavily scientific in nature, therefore implicating the Daubert
Standard. See generally Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993)
(interpreting Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which states “If scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine
a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.”). The test requires
the scientific evidence be relevant and reflect good science derived through sound
methodology. Id. at 596–601.
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show they have standing to do so.63 This is likely to be a hotly contested
issue.
Current gene editing techniques are likely to be applied at the embryo
stage, as cells at the fetus stage have differentiated too much for current
gene editing technologies to be effective. That said, several new gene
editing techniques are being developed that hold promise for application at
the fetus stage. The time during pregnancy when these treatments are
applicable is likely the stage at which the child’s legal rights will be
decided.
Under current Supreme Court jurisprudence, if standing is analyzed at
the time of genetic testing or when gene editing is rejected, the child likely
will not have standing, as the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade held “the
word ‘person’ as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the
unborn.”64 However, both Roe and its progeny acknowledge a significant
state interest in protecting a viable fetus’s life, which could lead future
courts to expand fetal rights.65
B. Potential Causes of Action
1. Parents’ Duty of Care to the Child
Generally, U.S. law does not impose an affirmative duty to act upon an
individual (“General Rule”).66 This is subject to several exceptions created

63. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 151 (1951)
(“Limitation on ‘the judicial Power of the United States’ is expressed by the requirement
that a litigant must have ‘standing to sue . . . .’”).
64. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 157-58 (1973).
65. Id. at 160 (“The situation therefore is inherently different from marital intimacy, or
bedroom possession of obscene material, or marriage, or procreation, or education . . . . As
we have intimated above, it is reasonable and appropriate for a State to decide that at some
point in time another interest, that of health of the mother or that of potential human life,
becomes significantly involved. The woman’s privacy is no longer sole and any right of
privacy she possesses must be measured accordingly.”).
66. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 37 (AM. LAW
INST. 2012) [hereinafter “Third Restatement”] (“An actor whose conduct has not created a
risk of physical or emotional harm to another has no duty of care to the other unless a court
determines that one of the affirmative duties provided in §§ 38–44 is applicable.”);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1965) [hereinafter “Second
Restatement”] (“The fact that the actor realizes or should realize that action on his part is
necessary for another’s aid or protection does not of itself impose upon him a duty to take
such action.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 illus. 1 (AM. LAW. INST. 1965) (“A
sees B, a blind man, about to step into the street in front of an approaching automobile. A
could prevent B from so doing by a word or touch without delaying his own progress. A
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Relevant exceptions are discussed

a. Affirmative Duty Created by Statute
Courts may find an affirmative duty where a federal or state statute
requires an individual to act for the protection of another in a certain
circumstance.68
i.

Child Abuse

One example of legislatively-created affirmative duties for parents are
child abuse laws (and related reporting requirements). These laws, which
have been implemented in every state,69 usually define child abuse as an act
(1) by a parent or caregiver who is responsible for a child’s (under 18 years
of age) welfare, (2) that affects the child, and (3) which results in imminent
risk or serious harm to a child’s health and welfare.70 While child abuse is
usually proven by affirmative actions, some courts have held omissions can
also lead to criminal culpability.71
The parents in the Hypothetical could be found criminally culpable for
child abuse. The mother’s decision not to have gene editing performed
would be an omission that resulted in the child being born with severe
Huntington’s disease, which poses an imminent risk to the child’s health

does not do so, and B is run over and hurt. A is under no duty to prevent B from stepping
into the street, and is not liable to B.”).
67. See, e.g., Phillips v. Deihm, 541 N.W.2d 566, 573 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (“A duty
can arise by statute, as well as by common law.”); State v. Walden, 293 S.E.2d 780, 785
(N.C. 1982) (“Where the common law has imposed affirmative duties upon persons
standing in certain personal relationships to others, such as the duty of parents to care for
their small children, one may be guilty of criminal conduct by failure to act or, stated
otherwise, by an act of omission.”).
68. Third Restatement, supra note 66, § 38.
69. Child Abuse Laws State-by-State, FINDLAW, http://family.findlaw.com/childabuse/child-abuse-laws-state-by-state.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2018); see also Pamela
Newell Williams, A Comparison of Child Advocacy Laws in Abuse and Neglect Cases in
England and the United States, 31 N.C. CENT. L. REV. 33, 39 (2008).
70. Child Abuse Overview, FINDLAW, http://criminal.findlaw.com/criminal-charges/
child-abuse-overview.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2017).
71. See e.g., Phillips, 541 N.W.2d at 573 (finding a grandmother breached her duty of
care to a grandchild because the grandmother failed to “act reasonably to prevent the sexual
abuse of that child”).
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and welfare.72 A child’s recovery for child abuse, however, would be much
less likely because most child abuse and neglect statutes do not create a
private cause of action.73 Several jurisdictions do, however, have statutes
that provide for either express or implied private causes of action.74
ii.

Child Neglect

Under child neglect laws, many states also vest parents with an
affirmative, non-delegable duty to provide adequate medical care to their
children.75 What constitutes adequate medical care differs between states.
New York defines adequate medical care as the degree of care provided by
a prudent, loving parent who is anxious for the well-being of the child.76
Whether this standard has been met depends upon the child’s condition, the
possibility of a cure or prevention (and the risk associated with such
treatment), and, if the parents have sought alternative treatment, whether
such treatment is recommended by reasonable medical authorities.77

72. See supra text accompanying note 15. As noted in the Hypothetical, this paper
presupposes that the gene editing treatment offered to the mother is safe and does not pose a
significant risk to the mother.
73. Marc A. Franklin & Matthew Ploeger, Of Rescue and Report: Should Tort Law
Impose a Duty to Help Endangered Persons and Abused Children?, 40 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 991, 1022 (2000) (“Most courts . . . have declined to find a civil duty to report child
abuse, whether based on the reporting statute or common law.”); see, e.g., Marquay v. Eno,
662 A.2d 272, 278 (N.H. 1995) (holding a compulsory child abuse or neglect reporting
statute did not create a private cause of action because neither the statute nor legislative
history revealed any such intent); see also Arbaugh v. Bd. of Educ., 591 S.E.2d 235
(holding a state statute for child abuse reporting did not imply a civil cause of action).
74. Arbaugh, 591 S.E.2d at 239 n.3 (stating there are state statutes for child abuse
reporting that “expressly create a private cause of action . . . [in] Arkansas, Colorado, Iowa,
Michigan, Montana, New York and Rhode Island.”); see, e.g., 40 R.I. GEN. LAWS Ann. §
40-11-6.1 (West 2004) (providing that in addition to criminal prosecution, a guilty
defendant can be civilly liable for the damages caused by the failure to report child abuse or
neglect).
75. See, e.g., Jensen ex rel. Jensen v. Cunningham, 250 P.3d 465, 484–85 (2011) (“The
state appropriately takes its parens patriae responsibility seriously. In fact, any person . . .
who has reason to believe that a child has been subjected to neglect is required to report the
abuse either to law enforcement or DCFS. And the statutory definition of neglect includes a
parent’s failure to provide proper or necessary medical care or any other care necessary for
the child’s health. A person required to report who ‘willfully fails to do so’ is subject to
criminal liability.”); see also In re Hofbauer, 47 N.Y.2d 648, 655 (1979); cf. People v.
Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201, 205–207 (1903); In re Faridah W., 180 A.D.2d 451, 452 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1992).
76. In re Hofbauer, 47 N.Y.2d at 654–55.
77. Id. at 656; see also In re Sampson, 37 A.D.2d 668, 668 (1971), aff’d, 29 N.Y.2d
900 (1972); In re Faridah, 180 A.D.2d at 452; In re Cicero, 101 Misc.2d 699, 702 (1979).

FRAZIER_MCCARTHY FINAL MACRO FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

54

HASTINGS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL

12/7/2018 4:14 PM

[Vol. 10:1

The court in In re Christine M. considered whether a father’s failure to
have his four-year-old daughter vaccinated for measles, when a New York
statute required it, made the daughter a “neglected child.”78 The court held
that facilitating a child’s measles vaccination constitutes sound and
necessary medical care, and therefore the father’s failure to have his
daughter vaccinated for measles during a measles outbreak (without a valid
religious exemption) made the daughter a “neglected child” within the legal
meaning of the statute.79
If in the proposed Hypothetical there were a compulsory gene editing
statute, a straight-forward analysis suggests that the parents’ choice to deny
gene editing treatment for the fetus violated the statute. Less clear is
whether the child would be deemed to have been neglected in the absence
of such a statute. If in utero gene editing is the only way to effectively treat
Huntington’s, the child (or state) would have a strong argument that the
parents neglected the child by failing to provide adequate medical care by
refusing gene editing.80 This argument would likely succeed if the
reviewing court utilizes the same analysis as the court in In re Christine M.

78. In re Christine M., 595 N.Y.S.2d 606, 610-11 (Fam. Ct. 1992); See N.Y. FAM. CT.
ACT § 1012(f) (McKinney 2017) (defining a “neglected child” as one “whose physical,
mental or emotional condition has been impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming
impaired as a result of the failure of his parent . . . to exercise a minimum degree of care (A)
in supplying the child with adequate . . . medical . . . care, though financially able to do so or
offered . . . other reasonable means to do so.”).
79. In re Christine M., 595 N.Y.S.2d at 618; but see In re Hofbauer 47 N.Y.2d at 654–
55 (where the New York Court of Appeals addressed the same statute on an appeal of a
petition requesting an eight-year-old child suffering from Hodgkin’s disease be deemed a
neglected child because the parents had failed to acquiesce to the attending doctor’s
recommendation that the child be treated with radiation and chemotherapy. The court held
the child was not a “neglected child” because his parents had undertaken reasonable efforts
to ensure the child was provided acceptable medical treatment. In coming to this
conclusion, the court considered the justifiable worries of the parents about the harmful
effects of radiation and chemotherapy, the parents’ securing of qualified doctors to aid in the
child’s care, that the nutritional treatments being administer by these doctors were
controlling the child’s condition, and that the child would be administered conventional
treatments if his condition warranted such). Despite the finding that the father’s failure to
get his daughter vaccinated constituted child neglect, the Christine M. court nonetheless
exercised its discretionary power and did not require the father to facilitate his daughter’s
vaccination because all evidence indicated the father was a capable and loving parent, there
was no other evidence of actual neglect (medical, emotional, or educational), and while the
daughter still faced a risk of contracting measles without vaccination, the measles outbreak
no longer existed at the time of trial. In re Christine M., 595 N.Y.S.2d at 618.
80. The parents may also be liable under child endangerment and/or failure to protect
laws, which expose individuals to criminal liability for subjecting children to inappropriate
and/or dangerous situations. All states have some form of these laws. See CHILD
ENDANGERMENT/FAILURE TO PROTECT LAWS, NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION
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While not the subject of this paper, it is worth noting that a more likely
alternative to a compulsory gene editing statute might be a state, via the
legislature or the judiciary, ordering parents with certain predispositions to
harmful genetic diseases not to procreate unless they undergo a
preimplantation genetic diagnosis to identify genetic defects within an
embryo, utilize available gene editing technologies to “fix” the genetic
defects that are present and which are explicitly enumerated in the state
statute, and then employ in vitro fertilization to impregnate the host mother.
b. Affirmative Duty Created by Parents’ Creation of Harm
Another exception to the General Rule occurs when an actor’s prior
conduct “creates a continuing risk of physical harm of a type characteristic
of the conduct,” thereby giving rise to a duty for the actor to “exercise
reasonable care to prevent or minimize the harm.”81 The child may argue
his or her suffering from Huntington’s is a continuing risk of physical
harm, as Huntington’s symptoms have varied onset periods, and present
themselves along a spectrum of severity.82
Such harm would be “characteristic of the conduct” because the parents
intentionally83 showed wanton disregard for the welfare of the potential
child by deciding to procreate, despite knowing that any resulting progeny
would have at least one dominant mutant allele, and therefore have
Huntington’s disease.84 Even if the parents argue neither one knew they
were homozygous dominant, let alone heterozygous dominant, the parents’
progeny inheriting Huntington’s disease might still have been foreseeable
to impose an affirmative duty.85 This might be the case where both parents
have a familial history of Huntington’s, and therefore would be remiss in

2-5 (Aug. 2014), https://ndaa.org/wp-content/uploads/Child-Endangerment-2014_-8_25_
2014_FINAL.pdf.
81. Third Restatement, supra note 66, § 39. The actor’s conduct must be sufficiently
connected with the potential for future harm to justify the imposition of such an affirmative
duty. Id.
82. See supra text accompanying note 15.
83. Third Restatement, supra note 66, § 39. While an actor does not need to know his
or her conduct created a risk of harm to raise a duty created by this exception, an objectively
foreseeable risk of harm must exist. Id. § 39 cmt. a; see, e.g., Grover v. Stechel, 45 P.3d 80
(N.M. Ct. App. 2002) (requiring that the harm be foreseeable before an affirmative duty is
imposed under Second Restatement of Torts § 321).
84. Third Restatement, supra note 66, § 39 cmt. c (“There must be a similar
relationship between the risk-creating conduct and the harm . . . the harm that occurs must
be closely enough related to the risks created by the conduct to justify imposition of a
duty.”).
85. Whether the harm is foreseeable is a question of fact for the jury. Id. § 39 cmt. d.
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not getting checked for Huntington’s before they procreated. However, if
both parents carry the trait, they should display symptoms, albeit perhaps
not until later in their lives, potentially after the point at which they have
procreated in the Hypothetical.
If harm to the child is deemed foreseeable, and in utero gene editing is
the only cure or treatment for Huntington’s, then the parents would have
likely breached their duty to “exercise reasonable care to prevent or
minimize the harm” by not pursuing gene editing treatment.86
However, even if the parents’ actios create a harm that raises an
affirmative duty of the type described above, the court may nonetheless
decide not to impose an affirmative duty, if doing so involves “special
problems of principle or policy.”87 Whether a judge exercises this
discretion will be determined on a case-by-case basis. That said, parents’
religious beliefs, as well as parental rights regarding reproduction and
related medical decisions, are likely to be compelling and thus considered
“special problems of principle or policy.”
c. Affirmative Duty Created By “Special Relationship”
An affirmative duty may also be imposed where an actor is in a
“special relationship”88 with another, and therefore owes that individual a
duty of reasonable care “with regard to risks that arise within the scope of
the relationship.”89 Parent-child relationships have been deemed “special
relationships” in many cases.90 Whether a “special relationship” exists and

86. Id. § 39. Third Restatement notes that “[i]f the injured person is as capable as the
actor of taking steps to mitigate further harm, the actor does not breach the duty of
reasonable care by failing to take those steps.” Id. § 39 cmt. e. However, such is not the
case in the Hypothetical put forth in this paper, as an embryo cannot take steps to mitigate
the harm (such as agreeing to gene editing) caused to the embryo by the parents’ decision to
get pregnant and reject gene editing.
87. Third Restatement, supra note 66, § 39 cmt. b.
88. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Superior Court, 413 P.3d 656, 664 (2018)
(“Generally, the [special] relationship has an aspect of dependency in which one party relies
to some degree on the other for protection . . . . [and is present] where the plaintiff is
particularly vulnerable and dependent upon the defend and, who correspondingly, has some
control over the plaintiff’s welfare.”).
89. Third Restatement, supra note 66, § 40(a); see, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of the
University of California, 17 Cal. 3d 425 (1976). This duty attaches regardless of the source
of the risk. Third Restatement, supra note 66, § 40 cmt. g.
90. See generally Second Restatement, supra note 66, §315; see, e.g., State v.
Williquette, 129 Wis.2d 239 (1986) (“When a special relationship exists between persons,
however, social policy may impose a duty to protect. The relationship between a parent and
a child exemplifies a special relationship where the duty to protect is imposed.”); but see
Third Restatement, supra note 66, § 40(a)–(b) (excluding the parent-child relationship as a
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the scope of duty flowing from any such special relationship are questions
of law to be determined by the court.91
In answering such questions with regard to the parents, courts will look
to the nature of the parties’ relationship, and whether the plaintiff in the
Hypothetical was within the zone of foreseeable harm.92
The best-known case for determining the existence of a “special
relationship” is Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California.93 The
court in Tarasoff addressed whether a psychologist, who had been told on
multiple occasions by a severe paranoid schizophrenic patient that the
patient planned to kill a fellow student, had an affirmative duty to the
potential victim (or their family) that required the physician to breach
doctor-patient confidentiality and warn the potential victim of the likely
impending harm.94
In doing so, the court noted that when circumstances require an actor to
take affirmative action to avoid a foreseeable harm (e.g., warning someone
about the likely conduct of another) the actor is usually only liable if they
have a “special relationship” with (1) the dangerous individual or (2) the
potential victim.95 The psychologist was found to have a “special
relationship” with the dangerous patient,96 which thereby imposed upon the
psychologist an affirmative duty to use reasonable care to protect the
student.97 The psychologist breached this duty by failing to warn the
potential victim of the patient’s plan (which the patient ended up executing,
bringing about this case).98
“special relationship”). Other examples of “special relationships” include psychologistpatient and warden-prisoner. See Second Restatement § 315.
91. John B. v. Superior Ct., 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d 316, 324 (2006) (“The existence of a legal
duty is a question of law for the court.”); see also State v. Neumann, 348 Wis.2d 455, 506
(2013).
92. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 344 (1928) (“The risk reasonably
to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed . . . .”); see also Johnson v. Jamaica Hosp., 62
NY2d 523, 527 (1984) (“The damaged plaintiff must be able to point the finger of
responsibility at a defendant owing, not a general duty to society, but a specific duty to
him.”).
93. See generally Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d 425.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 434.
96. Id. at 435–36.
97. Id. at 439 (“[O]nce a therapist does in fact determine, or under applicable
professions standards reasonably should have determined, that a patient poses a serious
danger of violence to others, he bears a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect the
foreseeable victim of that danger. [T]he therapist owes a legal duty not only to his patient,
but also to his patient’s would-be victim and is subject in both respects to scrutiny by judge
and jury.”).
98. Id.
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In deciding Tarasoff, the California Supreme Court set out seven
factors to determine the existence of a “special relationship,” and extent of
a resulting affirmative duty. These factors are:
(1) foreseeability of harm . . ., (2) degree of certainty that the
plaintiff suffered injury, (3) closeness of the connection between
the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, (4) moral blame
attached to the defendant’s conduct, (5) policy of preventing future
harm, (6) extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences
to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with
resulting liability for breach, and (7) availability, cost, and
prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.99
In the Hypothetical the child’s injury (Huntington’s) was diagnostically
certain, and foreseeable as the parents knew, or should have known, any
fetus they caused to be conceived would have the disorder. The parents’
decision to procreate despite this knowledge, and then to reject gene editing
(the one way to mitigate the harm), is directly connected to the child’s
injury and therefore likely will draw significant moral blame.100
Courts have also interpreted criminal laws to characterize a parentchild relationship as “special,” and as one that imposes an affirmative duty
to protect.101 Some examples include requiring the parent to: (1) report
suspected child neglect or abuse,102 (2) attempt to remove a child from an
abusive living situation,103 and (3) obtain needed medical care for the

99. Id. at 434.
100. Some might argue the mother’s decision to reject gene editing does not deserve
moral blame, as such a decision is within her rights to bodily autonomy and to make
pregnancy-related decisions.
101. Williquette, 385 N.W.2d at 150 (Wis. 1986) (the “relationship between a parent
and a child exemplifies a special relationship where the duty to protect is imposed”).
102. See Jessica R. Givelber, Imposing on Witnesses to Child Sexual Abuse: A Futile
Response to Bystander Indifference, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 3169, 3181 (1999) (finding all 50
states have enacted mandatory child abuse reporting statutes).
103. One review noted that the courts in these cases “determined that their state’s
legislature intended to treat a parent’s failure to act in the same way that it would punish the
affirmative act of abuse . . . . [T]he courts and legislatures have sent a strong message to
parents about their responsibility toward their children. If parents do not take action to
prevent abuse, they may face criminal liability.” Mary Kate Kearney, Breaking the Silence:
Tort Liability for Failing to Protect Children from Abuse, 42 BUFF. L. REV. 405, 434 (1994);
see, e.g., Williquette, 385 N.W.2d 145, 261 (holding that mother leaving her children with
their abusive father was sufficient to trigger criminal liability for child abuse).
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child.104 Despite the criminal liability that may result from a breach of
these duties,105 most states make available to parents some type of religious
exemption regarding medical care.106 Furthermore, as is the case in the
Restatement (Third) of Torts Subsection II(B)(1)(b), a court may decide,
based on “special problems of principle or policy” to either impose no duty
or only a duty of reasonable care.107 The same policy reasons in Subsection
II(B)(1)(b) are likely to be compelling.
2. State Mandated Medical Care
The state in the Hypothetical might argue that it may constitutionally
impose compulsory gene editing, regardless of parental, privacy, or
religious rights. The Supreme Court has held parents’ traditionally honored
right to rear their children according to the parents’ personal and religious
beliefs is superseded when either the health or safety of the child is
threatened, or when the parents’ conduct poses a substantial threat to public
safety.108 The government’s ability to interfere in such instances is usually
based upon the parens patriae doctrine109 or upon each state’s general
police power to promote public welfare.110 In supporting its argument for a
compulsory gene-editing law, the state may analogize its efforts to
compulsory vaccination laws (repeatedly found to be constitutional), and
instances where courts have ordered pregnant women to undergo cesarean
sections.

104. See State v. Cacchiotti, 568 A.2d 1026, 1026-27, 1031 (R.I. 1990) (upholding
conviction for involuntary manslaughter of a mother who failed to seek medical attention
for her son after he was severely beaten by mother’s boyfriend).
105. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE. ANN. §261.109 (Vernon 2015) (defining knowing
failure to report child abuse or neglect as class A misdemeanor).
106. See infra Subsection II.C.2; see also Richard W. Garnett, Taking Pierce Seriously:
The Family, Religious Education, and Harm to Children, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 109, 111
(2000) (“Most states, however, exempt religious parents from prosecution, or limit their
exposure to criminal liability, when their failure to seek medical care for their sick or injured
children is motivated by religious belief.”).
107. Third Restatement, supra note 66, § 40 cmt. b.
108. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944); see also Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652 (1972); Jehovah’s
Witnesses v. King County Hospital, 390 U.S. 598 (1968).
109. Under this doctrine, the state may act as a guardian “for those who are unable to
care for themselves, such as children or disabled individuals.” Parens Patriae, LEGAL INFO.
INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/parens_patriae (last visited Nov. 6, 2017).
110. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166-69; see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766
(1982).
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a. Compulsory Vaccination Laws
All 50 states have passed some form of compulsory vaccination law for
children attending public schools.111 Both times the Supreme Court has
addressed these types of laws, they have been found to be a valid exercise
of a state’s police power, aimed at promoting public health or safety.112
In Jacobson v. Massachusetts, the Court found the state legislature had
the discretion to enact a compulsory smallpox vaccination statute under its
police power because the state did so in response to a smallpox outbreak
that “imperiled the entire population” and the compulsory vaccination had
a “real [and] substantial relation to the protection of the public health and
the public safety.”113
In Zucht v. King, the Court upheld a city ordinance114 providing for
compulsory vaccination for all schoolchildren, regardless of whether an
immediate threat of an epidemic existed (as was the case in Jacobson).115
The Court rejected plaintiff’s due process arguments, holding “the
municipality may vest in its official’s broad discretion in matters affecting
the application and enforcement of a health law.”116
After Jacobson and Zucht, several federal117 and state118 courts have
come to similar conclusions finding compulsory vaccination statutes

111. Kyra R. Wagoner, Mandating the Gardasil Vaccine: A Constitutional Analysis, 5
IND. HEALTH L. REV. 403, 415 (2008).
112. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26-27 (1905) (holding it is within a state’s
power to enact a compulsory vaccination law); see also Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922).
113. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 31.
114. The ordinance read “no child or any other person shall attend a public school or
other place of education without having first presented a certificate of vaccination.” Zucht,
260 U.S. at 175.
115. Id. Subsequently, the Fourth Circuit in Workman v. Mingo Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 419
F. App’x 348, 353 (4th Cir. 2011) held Jacobson’s holding is not limited to diseases that
present an immediate danger. This is significant, as the child in the Hypothetical having
Huntington’s disease would not cause immediate danger to the child, but rather danger when
the child reaches age of onset, usually in the 30-40 age range. See infra note 15 and
accompanying text.
116. Id. at 176 (citing Lieberman v. Van de Carr, 199 U.S. 552 (1905)).
117. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Boozman, 212 F. Supp. 2d 945, 948 (W.D. Ark. 2002)
(“The constitutional right to freely practice one’s religion does not provide an exemption for
parents seeking to avoid compulsory immunization for their school-aged children”); see also
Sherr v. Northport–East Northport Union Free School District, 672 F.Supp. 81, 88
(E.D.N.Y. 1987) (“it has been settled law for many years that claims of religious freedom
must give way in the face of the compelling interest of society in fighting the spread of
contagious diseases through mandatory inoculation programs”).
118. See, e.g., Wright v. DeWitt School District, 385 S.W.2d 644, 646 (Ark. 1965) (it is
within the state’s police power “to require that school children be vaccinated and that such
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constitutional and within the state’s police power.119 If courts continue to
follow Zucht’s expanded view of what statutes a state may pass to protect
the public health under Jacobson, a compulsory gene editing statute that
addresses circumstances such as those in the Hypothetical, as long as it
meets other applicable legal tests,120 will likely be found constitutional.
b. Court-ordered Cesarean Sections
While less common in recent times, there is a body of case law
involving instances where hospitals or physicians have requested court
orders to force women to have cesarean sections. For instance, the Georgia
Supreme Court in Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hospital Authority
held a pregnant mother near birth, did not have the right to refuse surgery
(or other medical treatment) if the fetus’s life was at stake.121
However, more recent cases have tended to recognize pregnant
women’s right to refuse medical treatment. One recent article found that
the last time an appellate court upheld a trial court’s order for a cesarean
section was in 1981.122 The court in In re A.C. held a physician must honor
a competent mother’s decision of whether to get a cesarean section,123 and
the court in In Re Baby Boy Doe v. Doe held a pregnant mother had a right
to refuse a physician-suggested cesarean section on religious grounds.124
The Doe court, in coming to its holding, noted no state statute or case law
supported the request for a court to mandate the mother undergo a cesarean
section.125 The Doe court also rejected the argument that Roe v. Wade’s126

requirement does not violate the constitutional rights of anyone, on religious grounds or
otherwise”); see also Cude v. State, 377 S.W.2d 816, 819 (Ark. 1964) (“According to the
great weight of authority, it is within the police power of the State to require that school
children be vaccinated against smallpox, and that such requirement does not violate the
constitutional rights of anyone, on religious grounds or otherwise”).
119. One review of cases found that “every court to consider challenges to compulsory
vaccination laws has upheld the statutes.” Erwin Chemerinsky & Michele Goodwin,
Compulsory Vaccination Laws are Constitutional, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 589, 603 (2016); see,
e.g., Workman, 419 F. App’x 348b (the court rejected parents’ claim to a religious right not
to vaccinate their children, noting “[t]he right to practice religion freely does not include
liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable disease or the latter to ill
health”) (quoting Prince, 321 U.S. at 166–67).
120. See infra Subsection II.C.2.
121. Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding Cty. Hosp. Auth., 347 Ga. 86 (1981).
122. Farah Diaz-Tello, When the Invisible Hand Wields a Scalpel: Maternity Care in
the Market Economy, 18 CUNY L. REV. 197, 213 (2015).
123. 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990).
124. 260 Ill. App. 3d 392 (1994).
125. Id. at 397.
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emphasis on states’ interest in protecting a viable fetus enabled the state in
this instance, to mandate the cesarean section.127
Despite the strong, more recent trend against requiring cesarean
sections, case law nonetheless conveys some courts’ willingness to order
intrusive medical procedures during pregnancy. Gene editing is arguably
less intrusive on a mother’s rights than a cesarean section, and therefore
may survive the balancing test applied in the cases cited above.
3. Medical Malpractice-like Causes of Action
The child may look to certain types of existing medical malpractice
actions for support in bringing a tort claim against his or her parents for
failure to use gene editing. All U.S. jurisdictions allow an embryo or fetus
injured in the womb, who is later born alive, to recover tort damages.128
While such actions involve a different combination of involved parties,
they nonetheless are similar enough in nature to the hypothetical scenario
to be instructive.
a. Harm to Unborn Child
Early decisions denied recovery of tort damages for a child who was
injured in the womb but was later born alive,129 based on the belief (1) no
duty was owed to a person who did not yet exist, (2) there was too great a
problem with causal proof, and (3) there was too significant a danger of
unfounded claims.130 However, this trend was bucked in Bonbrest v. Kotz,
where the court held for the first time that a child could recover damages in
proper prenatal injury cases, reasoning that the common law protections
previously afforded to a viable fetus in the realms of criminal and abortion
law should also be extended to viable fetuses with regard to harm to unborn
children.131 Initially, following Bonbrest, most courts limited recovery to
situations where the fetus was viable at the time of injury.132 In recent

126. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
127. Doe, 260 Ill. App. 3d at 404.
128. Second Restatement, supra note 66, § 869; see also Matthew Browne,
Preconception Tort Law in an Era of Assisted Reproduction: Applying a Nexus Test for
Duty, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2555, 2560 (2001).
129. Second Restatement, supra note 66, § 869.
130. Id.
131. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946). The change in Bonbrest was driven by significant
advancements in our knowledge of embryology and legal commentators’ advocacy to
recognize the unborn child as a legal entity. Id.
132. Browne, supra note 128, at 2560.
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years, the preponderance of jurisdictions have rejected that requirement,
opting instead to allow recovery where the injury occurred any time after
conception.133
A minority of jurisdictions go as far as to allow recovery of damages
when the injury occurred before the child’s conception.134 In such cases, a
child can generally only recover where the defendant’s conduct causing the
harm is a tortious, 135 legal cause of harm.136 Courts have found conduct to
be sufficiently “tortious” to impose liability where the conduct was
intended to harm a mother or the fetus, or negligent with regard to either
individual.137 The child in the Hypothetical would likely have a viable
argument that the parents intentionally acted (by becoming pregnant and
not securing gene editing) in a way they knew, or should have known,
would result in significant harm to the fetus once he/she has reached the
onset age of Huntington’s disease.138 The child might also be able to
successfully argue his or her parents’ acts were so unreasonably and
recklessly dangerous, in that they knew, or should have known, that their
progeny had a 100% likelihood of suffering from severe Huntington’s, that
strict liability should be imposed.139

133. Id.; but see Andrews v. Keltz, 838 N.Y.S.2d 363 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007) (disallowing
recovery of tort damages for injury to a lab-created human embryo pre-implantation,
because there was no duty to a pre-implantation human embryo).
134. See, e.g., Martin v. St. John Hosp. & Med. Ctr. Corp., 517 N.W.2d 787, 789 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1994) (providing the following analogy: “[a]ssume a balcony is negligently
constructed. Two years later, a mother and her one-year-old child step onto the balcony and
it gives way, causing serious injury to both the mother and the child. It would be ludicrous
to suggest that only the mother would have a cause of action against the builder but, because
the infant was not conceived at the time of the negligent conduct, no duty of care existed
toward the child”); see also Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1255 (Ill.
1977).
135. Second Restatement, supra note 66, § 869 cmt. b.
136. Id. § 869 cmt. c.
137. Id. § 869 cmt. b.
138. The harm would not be suffered immediately, as the symptoms of Huntington’s
disease do not normally present until after the age of 30. Huntington’s Disease, supra note
15. The exceptions to this onset age range are (1) when an individual inherits two mutant
alleles (as opposed to one), Squitieri et al., supra note 16, and (2) Juvenile Huntington
Disease, which is caused by a mutation called a trinucleotide repeat in the Huntington
Disease HTT gene. Juvenile Huntington Disease, GENETICS HOME REFERENCE,
http://rarediseases.info.nih.gov/diseases/10510/juvenile-huntington-disease (last visited Apr.
11, 2018).
139. Sufficient tortious conduct will also be found where conduct is abnormally
dangerous enough to impose strict liability. Second Restatement, supra note 66, § 869 cmt. b.
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b. Wrongful Life
The child denied gene editing in the Hypothetical may sue his or her
parents under a “wrongful life” action. “Wrongful life” actions are usually
brought by a child born with a disability (or by his or her guardian ad
litem)140 against a doctor or healthcare provider for medical malpractice.141
Plaintiffs usually argue defendant(s) acted contrary to common medical
practice or procedures in not properly diagnosing or disclosing to the
parents the fetus’s injury or genetic abnormality, thereby foreclosing the
parents’ right to terminate the pregnancy.142
Many states do not allow “wrongful life” suits because of public policy
considerations including (1) the life of a disabled child is better than no life
at all and (2) the extreme difficulty in calculating damages.143 However, a
minority of states, such as California, have recognized the legal viability of
wrongful life suits.144 If gene editing becomes as safe and inexpensive as
expected in the Hypothetical,145 the child in the Hypothetical would likely
be able to argue for a duty to use gene editing by drawing a strong analogy
between the existing medical malpractice standards and his or her situation.

140. An individual who can be appointed by a court to protect the interests of an
individual involved in a lawsuit, who cannot adequately represent his or her own interests.
Guardian Ad Litem, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/guardian_ad
_litem (last visited Nov. 18, 2017).
141. Wrongful Life Lawsuits, BIRTH INJ. JUST., https://www.birthinjuryjustice.org/typesof-birth-injuries/wrongful-life-lawsuits/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2017).
142. Id.
143. Id. Courts have often referred to this idea as the “utter void of non-existence.” Id.;
see, e.g., Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 28 (1967), abrogated by Berman v. Allan, 404
A.2d 8 (N.J. 1979) (“Damages are measured by comparing the condition plaintiff would
have been in, had the defendants not been negligent, with plaintiff’s impaired condition as a
result of the negligence. The infant plaintiff would have us measure the difference between
his life with defects against the utter void of nonexistence, but it is impossible to make such
a determination. This Court cannot weigh the value of life with impairments against the
nonexistence of life itself”) (emphasis added); see also White v. U.S., 510 F.Supp. 146, 148
(1981) (“A cause of action brought by the “wrongfully born” child has been rejected in most
jurisdictions as uncompensable because it is impossible to measure the damages for his life
against the utter void of nonexistence”) (emphasis added) (citing Stills v. Gratton, 55
Cal.App.3d 698 (1976); Dumer v. St. Michael’s Hospital, 69 Wis.2d 766 (1975); Zepeda v.
Zepeda, 41 Ill.App.2d 240 (1963), cert. denied 379 U.S. 945, (1964)).
144. Wendy F. Hensel, The Disabling Impact of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life
Actions, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 141, 161 (2005).
145. This is more likely to happen for IVF, PGD screened embryos, than it is for
naturally conceived embryos in utero. See Ian Sample, IVF Technique that Tests Embryos
for Genetic Disorders Has First Success, GUARDIAN (July 27, 2014, 7:01 PM),
http://www.theguardian/com/society/2014/jul/28/ivf-genetic-disorder-check-first-pregnan
cy-embryo-london.
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The parents’ decision to refuse gene editing despite knowing their fetus
would have severe Huntington’s, is likely to constitute action contrary to
common parental practices in similar situations.
C. Potential Parental Defenses
While the parents may raise a host of procedural arguments,146 the
following sections focus on substantive defenses commonly raised by
parents involved in similar actions to the type discussed above.
1. Parental Immunity Doctrine
The hypothetical parents might argue they are protected by the Parental
Immunity Doctrine. This doctrine, created in Hewlett v. George, posits that
children cannot sue their parents (and vice-versa) in civil suits.147 Although
the court in Hewlett does not cite to any authority to support this doctrine,
41 other states subsequently adopted some form of the immunity.148
However, the Parental Immunity Doctrine has been significantly
limited in recent years. 149 In Merrick v. Sutterlin, the court held a child,
injured by a parent’s negligence in causing a car accident, could sue the
parent.150 Similarly, the court in Schenk v. Schenk151 held that the Parental
Immunity Doctrine does not apply where a parent or child willfully,
wantonly, or as part of criminal conduct, inflicts injury upon the other.152

146. See discussion supra Section II.A.
147. Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703 (1891). This doctrine is in large part based upon
the public policy of trying to maintain the family structure by not undermining parents’
authority over their children. Schenk v. Schenk, 100 Ill. App. 2d 199, 202 (1968) (“The
public policy involved is the interest of the State in maintaining harmony, avoiding strife,
and insuring a proper atmosphere of cooperation, discipline and understanding in the
family”).
148. Rousey v. Rousey, 528 A.2d 416, 417 (D.C. 1987) (declining to utilize the doctrine
of parental immunity).
149. Third Restatement, supra note 66, § 40 cmt. o (“family immunities have long been
removed as an impediment to [the] development [of case law recognizing affirmative duties
among family members”); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895G(1) (1965)
(“A parent or child is not immune from tort liability to the other solely by reason of that
relationship”).
150. See Merrick v. Sutterlin, 93 Wash. 2d 411 (Wash. 1980).
151. Schenk v. Schenk, 100 Ill. App. 2d 199 (1968).
152. Id. at 202 (“Any justification for the rule of parental immunity can be found only
in a reluctance to create litigation and strife between members of the family unit. While the
policy might be such justification to prevent suits for mere negligence within the scope of
the parental relationship public policy should not prevent a minor from obtaining redress for
willful and wanton misconduct on the part of a parent”) (internal quotations omitted).
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The significant deterioration of the Parents Immunity Doctrine makes
the parents’ successful utilization of the doctrine to bar a child’s claim
based on failure to use gene editing unlikely unless the parents live in one
of the few jurisdictions still allowing the doctrine to be employed in limited
types of actions.153
2. Free Exercise of Religion
The parents might argue they have a right to refuse compulsory gene
editing because it unduly infringes upon their First Amendment religious
liberty freedoms. The First Amendment reads in part, “Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof.”154 This encompasses two concepts: freedom to believe155
and freedom to act.156 While the freedom to believe is absolute, the
Supreme Court has noted an individual’s “[c]onduct remains subject to
regulation for the protection of society,”157 as long as the regulatory power
is exercised to attain a permissible end, and in doing so, does not unduly
infringe the protected freedom.158
Parents asserting a free exercise of religion defense may have to deal
with the Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Division v. Smith, which
held a religiously neutral and generally applicable law will not be found to

153. See, e.g., Squeglia v. Squeglia, 661 A.2d 1007 (Conn. 1995) (holding the doctrine
of parental immunity bars actions based on negligence or strict liability); see also Frye v.
Frye, 505 A.2d 826, 839 (Md. 1986) (declining to repeal the application of parental
immunity in negligence cases); Mitchell v. Davis, 598 So. 2d 801, 805 (Ala. 1992)
(endorsing application of parental immunity to negligence claims against defendant foster
parents and government agencies (deemed to be acting in loco parentis)); Amy L. Nilsen,
Comment, Speaking Out Against Passive Parent Child Abuse: The Time Has Come to Hold
Parents Liable for Failing to Protect Their Children, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 253, 285 (2000)
(noting that Texas’s doctrine of parental immunity “will continue to bar a child’s recovery
from a passive parent as long as courts continue to narrowly interpret its exceptions”).
154. U.S. Const. amend. I.
155. Preventing US laws from pressuring or coercing any individual to accept a
particular form of worship, and thereby providing individuals the freedom to choose
whatever religious form they want. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
156. Protecting an individual’s free exercise of his or her chosen form of religion. Id.
157. Id.; see also Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878) (“Laws are made
for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and
opinions, they may with practices. Suppose one believed that human sacrifices were a
necessary part of religious worship, would it be seriously contended that the civil
government under which he lived could not interfere to prevent a sacrifice?”).
158. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 304 (“the power to regulate must be so exercised as not, in
attaining a permissible end, unduly to infringe the protected freedom”).
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have violated the Free Exercise Clause.159 The hypothetical gene-editing
law is generally applicable160 (although only triggered by fetal genetic
abnormalities) and is religiously neutral in that it does not target, nor
benefit, any religion.
Employment Division was seemingly superseded by the subsequent
passage of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (“RFRA”),161
which sought to “provide greater protection for religious exercise than is
available under the First Amendment.”162 However, the Supreme Court
held in City of Boerne v. Flores that the RFRA, which Congress sought to
apply to the States and their subdivisions via Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, was unconstitutional as applied to states as it exceeded
Congress’ powers under that provision.163 The RFRA does, however,
continue to apply to the federal government.164
Congress responded to the decision in Boerne by enacting The
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”),165
which applies to the States and their subdivisions and invokes
congressional authority under the Spending and Commerce Clauses.166 The
RLUIPA is narrower in scope than the RFRA, concerning two areas of
government activity not involved in the proposed hypothetical: land use
regulation,167 and religious exercise by institutionalized persons.168

159. 494 U.S. 872 (1990); see also Chemerinsky & Goodwin, supra note 119, at 609
(“no matter how much a law burdens religious practices, it is constitutional under Smith so
long as it does not single out religious behavior for punishment and was not motivated by a
desire to interfere with religion”).
160. Even if the parents successfully argue the law is not “generally applicable,” the
court in Zucht dispelled the belief that a lack of general applicability means the law violates
equal protection. Zucht, 260 U.S. at 176–77 (“A long line of decisions by this court had
also settled that in the exercise of the police power reasonable classification may be freely
applied, and that regulation is not violative of the equal protection clause merely because it
is not all-embracing”).
161. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq.
162. Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 859–60 (2015) (citing Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2760–61 (2014)).
163. 521 U.S. 507, 532–36 (1997).
164. See, e.g., Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S.
418, 418 (2006) (“Among other things, RFRA prohibits the Federal Government from
substantially burdening a person's exercise of religion.”) (emphasis added); see also
Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2759 (We hold that the regulations that impose this obligation violate
RFRA, which prohibits the Federal Government from taking any action that substantially
burdens the exercise of religion unless that action constitutes the least restrictive means of
serving a compelling government interest.”) (emphasis added).
165. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–1(b).
166. Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 860 (2015).
167. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc.
168. See id. at § 2000cc–1.
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Smith also established that neutral and generally applicable laws are
analyzed using the highly deferential rational basis test, which requires (1)
the challenged statute have a legitimate state interest, and (2) the
government be able to show a reasonable, rational connection between the
statute’s means and its goals.169 Using gene editing to treat otherwise
incurable diseases clearly falls under the recognized legitimate interest of
public health,170 and there is a strong argument that in utero gene editing
done to fix a genetic abnormality that can only be addressed during the
embryonic stage of development, is a reasonable and rational means by
which to achieve the public health interest. If courts address compulsory
gene-editing in the same way they have addressed compulsory vaccination,
the parents’ argument will likely fail.171
3. Religious Exemptions
The parents may also argue compulsory gene-editing intrudes on the
right to practice their chosen religion and therefore requires a
constitutionally-driven religious exemption to the duty to use gene editing.
The viability of this argument likely depends upon whether the
hypothetical state legislature created such an exemption, for as the Supreme
Court noted in Smith, religious exemptions should be created by the
legislature, not by the judiciary.172
Religious exemptions, while
constitutional if narrowly tailored, are not required by the Free Exercise
Clause, where the statute in question is religiously neutral and generally
applicable, such as a law governing drug use.173 Some courts have even
found religious exemptions to be unconstitutional.174

169. 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990); see also Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1206 (9th Cir.
1999) (“In Employment Division v. Smith, the Court analyzed a free exercise of religion
claim under a rational basis test. Under this test, a rationally based, neutral law of general
applicability does not violate the right to free exercise of religion even though the law
incidentally burdens a particular religious belief or practice.”) (internal citations omitted).
170. See discussion supra Subsection II.B.2.a.
171. See discussion supra Subsection II.B.2.a. Both times the Supreme Court has
addressed compulsory vaccination laws, it has noted these laws are neutral and generally
applicable because they apply to all citizens in a given jurisdiction and are not motivated by
a desire to interfere with religious practices. Chemerinsky & Goodwin, supra note 119, at
610.
172. Chemerinsky & Goodwin, supra note 119, at 609.
173. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (holding that state legislatures may enact narrowly tailored
religious exceptions to such affirmative duties without violating the Constitution’s
establishment clause).
174. See, e.g., Brown v. Stone, 378 So. 2d 218 (Miss. 1979) (finding a religious
exemption unconstitutional because it was only available to members of recognized
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In the case of criminal laws relating to parents failing to seek medical
care for their sick or injured children, many states have enacted full or
partial religious exemptions for parents that have failed to do so for
religiously motivated reasons.175
However, such issues are murkier with regard to civil liability. Once
again, it is instructive to examine compulsory vaccination statutes, which
are usually accompanied by religious exemptions available to those who
(1) hold a religious belief that is against the mandated action, and (2)
sincerely hold that religious belief.176 To meet this, and similar, tests, the
opposition of the party requesting the religious exemption must “stem from
religious conviction and have not merely been framed in terms of religious
belief so as to gain the legal remedy desired.”177 Whether a belief is
“sincerely held” is a question of fact for the trial court,178 aimed at granting

denominations); see also Davis v. State, 451 A.2d 107, 113 (Md. 1982) (holding a religious
exemption clause to the state’s compulsory vaccination statute violated the First
Amendment’s establishment clause because the exemption was only available to children
whose parents were members of a recognized religious denomination). For a more in-depth
analysis of similar arguments, see Allan J. Jacobs, Do Belief Exemptions to Compulsory
Vaccination Programs Violate the Fourteenth Amendment?, 42 U. MEM. L. REV. 73 (2011).
175. Garnett, supra note 106 (“Most states, however, exempt religious parents from
prosecution, or limit their exposure to criminal liability, when their failure to seek medical
care for their sick or injured children is motivated by religious belief”).
176. Sherr, 672 F. Supp. at 92, 94 (finding that with regard to state-required
vaccinations, religious exemptions are usually available to those who (1) hold a religious
belief that is against vaccination (opposed to being against vaccinations because of medical
or moral reasons), and (2) sincerely hold the religious belief in (1)); see also Shaun P.
McFall, Vaccination & Religious Exemptions, FIRST AMEND. CTR. (Aug. 18, 2008),
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/vaccination-religious-exemptions/ (noting that states
often utilize one of three standards for religious exemptions, including: (1) the requesting
parents must be members of a religious organization that is recognized and that opposes
vaccination, (2) the requesting parents must show a sincere and genuinely held religious
belief opposing one or all of the required vaccinations, (3) the requesting parents must sign a
statement confirming they want an exemption because of a religious-based opposition to
vaccination).
177. Sherr, 672 F. Supp. at 94.
178. U.S. v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965); see, e.g., Sherr, 672 F. Supp. at 96-97
(finding one pair of plaintiffs’ views to be religious but not sincerely held because one of the
plaintiffs joined a religious organization for the sole purpose of obtaining a religious
exemption, and because the pair had previously requested a vaccination requirement
exemption based on science, safety, and conscience justifications. Finding another pair of
plaintiffs’ views to be religious and sincerely held because the plaintiffs’ religiously-driven
“conception of human existence and the physical world seems to pervade their whole way of
life,” and because one of the plaintiff’s impressed upon the court “the seriousness with
which he ha[d] contemplated the foundations of his religious beliefs and their implications
for his family’s daily life . . . .”). One court has noted an “adherent’s belief would not be
‘sincere’ if he acts in a manner inconsistent with the belief” or “if there is evidence that the
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exemptions only to those whose beliefs’ are held as a matter of
conscience.179 Courts typically give significant weight to witnesses’
demeanor and apparent candor.180 Such inquiries are usually difficult for
courts, and often teeter on the edge of violating the First Amendment.181
Therefore, if the state in the Hypothetical has a religious exemption to
compulsory gene editing, the parents’ ability to successfully request that
exemption would be dependent upon their religious beliefs, and how they
testified. However, if the state in the Hypothetical did not have a religious
exemption to the compulsory gene editing law, the parents would likely be
unsuccessful in arguing they have a constitutional guarantee to an
otherwise generally applicable, religiously neutral statute.
4. Constitutionally-protected Privacy Rights
The parents might also argue that compulsory gene editing violates the
mother’s Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy recognized in Griswold v.
Connecticut,182 and utilized by the court in Roe v. Wade to vest pregnant
women with a constitutionally-protected right to abort their pregnancies

adherent materially gains by fraudulently hiding secular interests behind a veil of religious
doctrine.” Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness v. Barber, 650 F.2d 430, 441 (1981).
179. Barber, 650 F.2d at 441 (noting the goal of the “sincerity analysis”—aimed at
determining a requesting party’s subjective good faith - is to “protect only those beliefs
which are held as a matter of conscience . . . [I]t is frequently difficult to separate this
inquiry from a forbidden one involving the verity of the underlying belief . . . an adherent’s
belief would not be ‘sincere’ if he acts in a manner inconsistent with the belief . . . or if there
is evidence that the adherent materially gains by fraudulently hiding secular interests behind
a veil of religious doctrine.”).
180. Lewis v. Sobol, 710 F. Supp. 506, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (finding mother’s
testimony to be “sincere, direct, and very credible”); see also Sherr, 672 F. Supp. at 96-97
(finding one pair of the plaintiffs’ manifested “complete sincerity”).
181. Barber, 650 F.2d at 430. Courts have struggled to define what “religion” and
“religious beliefs” mean. The Supreme Court has held “religion” to involve the “ultimate
concerns” of individuals, Seeger, 380 U.S. at 187, and stated the “test of belief ‘in relation
to a Supreme Being’ is whether a given belief that is sincere and meaningful occupies a
place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God.” Id. at
165–66. The Second Circuit has expanded upon this idea and noted one criterion of a
religion is that a believer will categorically disregard elementary self-interest rather than
transgress the religion’s tenets. United States v. Allen, 760 F.2d 447, 450 (2nd Cir.1985).
182. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that the Bill of Rights has certain penumbras of
rights, including the right to privacy. Specifically, the Court held that the right to privacy is
“fundamental” when it comes to the actions of married couples because such privacy “‘is of
the character that it cannot be denied without violating those fundamental principles of
liberty and justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions’”) (quoting
Powell v. State of Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932)).
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prior to the fetus attaining viability.183 In doing so, the Court in Roe
acknowledged a pregnant woman’s autonomy over her pregnancy during
the first trimester and the right to abortion during the second and third
trimesters subject to varying levels of state control.184
The mother might argue Roe’s first-trimester blanket autonomy makes
any compulsory gene-editing statute unconstitutional as applied to her if
the mother’s genetic testing and the physician’s suggestion of gene-editing
occurred prior to the end of the first trimester. However, this argument is
unlikely to be successful, as most genetic tests are done during the second
trimester (with a suggestion of gene-editing likely to follow thereafter if
necessary).185 Even if the mother did get testing during the first trimester,
the court in Roe stated first-trimester autonomy “is not absolute and is
subject to some limitations; and that at some point the state interest as to
protection of health, medical standards, and prenatal life, become
dominant.”186
If the mother’s genetic testing occurred during the second trimester,
Roe likely would be of little help to the mother. As the Court noted, “the
State . . . [has an] important and legitimate interest in protecting the
potentiality of human life”—one which “grows in substantiality as the
woman approaches term, and at a point during pregnancy . . . becomes
‘compelling.’”187 The Court noted the state’s interest in protecting fetal life
after viability is strong enough that a state may proscribe abortion after that
point.188 If the state’s interest in protecting fetal life is strong enough to
require a mother to go through childbirth and assume the responsibilities
associated with motherhood (by not allowing abortion), it is not
183. Roe, 410 U.S. 113 (“This right to privacy [(referring in part to the right to privacy
found in Griswold)], whether it be founded in the Fourth Amendment’s concept of personal
liberty and restrictions upon state action . . . or . . . in the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of
rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy.”).
184. Nancy K. Rhoden, Trimesters and Technology: Revamping Roe v. Wade, 95 YALE
L.J. 639, 639–48 (1986).
185. Amniocentesis and chorionic villus sampling (CVS) - the two most common types
of in utero genetic screening - are done between 15 and 20 weeks, and 10 and 13 weeks of
pregnancy, respectively. Prenatal Genetic Diagnostic Tests, ACOG (Sept. 2016), https://
www.acog.org/Patients/FAQs/Prenatal-Genetic-Diagnostic-Tests.
186. Roe, 410 U.S. at 155.
187. Id. at 162–63. The Court in Roe went on to clarify the “‘compelling’ point is at
viability . . . because the fetus then presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside
the mother’s womb.” Id. at 163.
188. Id. at 163–64 (“State regulation protective of fetal life after viability thus has both
logical and biological justifications. If the State is interested in protecting fetal life after
viability, it may go as far as to proscribe abortion during that period, except when it is
necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.”).
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unreasonable to think the state’s interest is also strong enough to impose
compulsory gene editing in certain situations starting in the second
trimester (when gene editing is most likely to be used).
5. Constitutionally-protected Parental Rights
The parents in the Hypothetical may argue that compulsory gene
editing infringes upon their constitutional right to control their child’s
upbringing.189 However, these traditionally recognized parental rights are
not absolute. While there exists a “private realm of family life which the
state cannot enter,”190 states may pass and enforce a law impinging on these
rights if such law is necessary to protect the health and/or well-being of
children.191 An example of this is compulsory vaccination laws, which
have been analyzed under the rational basis test,192 but are believed by
many constitutional law experts to meet even the strict scrutiny test.193 If a
compulsory gene-editing law is analyzed the same way as compulsory
vaccination laws, it will likely be found constitutional.
Conclusion
Gene editing has a myriad of potentially beneficial uses with wideranging implications.194 It could significantly improve public health by

189. Meyer v. Nebraska 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (holding parents have a substantive due
process right to make decisions regarding the upbringing of their children); see also Pierce
v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (“The child is not the mere creature of the
State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high
duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.”); Troxel v. Granville, 530
U.S. 57, 72–3 (2000) (“The liberty interest at issue in this case—the interest of parents in
the care, custody, and control of their children—is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental
liberty interests recognized by this Court.”).
190. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166.
191. Id. at 158 (“[T]he family itself is not beyond regulation in the public interest . . . .
Acting to guard the general interest in youth’s well being, the state as parens patriae may
restrict the parent’s control by requiring school attendance, regulating or prohibiting the
child’s labor and in many other ways.”).
192. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
193. Chemerinsky & Goodwin, supra note 119, at 613–14. Strict scrutiny is the highest
level of scrutiny applied by courts and requires the government to prove (1) the challenged
law has a compelling state interest, and (2) the law is narrowly tailored to achieve its result.
See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict
Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 800 (2006).
194. Potential future uses for CRISPR gene editing include: (1) removing malaria from
mosquitos, (2) eliminating cancers like lymphoblastic leukemia, (3) treating muscular
dystrophy, (4) making pig organs suitable for transplantation into humans, (5) treating HIV,
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eradicating genetically caused disorders, and significantly reduce medical
costs by foreclosing the need for the long-term care associated with such
disorders. Therefore, in building this framework, it is important to first and
foremost have a solid grasp of how the technology being used impacts the
implicated legal issues. Specifically, there must be standing. As such, a
comprehensive understanding of embryonic and fetal development, as well
as what points in time different gene editing technologies can be utilized,
will be crucial to understanding what legal issues, rights, and duties may be
implicated. However, as with most new technologies, gene editing brings
with it risks, as well as moral and ethical considerations. These questions
are not of the yes or no sort—they warrant substantial debate and
discussion.
Despite the science fiction-like nature of gene editing, the legal
framework built to govern its use (and potential misuse) will likely, at least
initially, be constructed using established legal principles. It will be
instructive to consider the scope of existing parent-child duties; policy
reasons for/against a parents’ criminal or civil liability for prenatal injury;
and the traditionally recognized constitutional rights of privacy, religious
liberty, and parental autonomy in raising children. Balancing these
interests will be a difficult task, but one that needs to be addressed while
gene editing is still in its infancy.

and (6) treating genetic mutation-caused blindness. Jay Bennett, 11 Crazy Gene-Hacking
Things We Can Do With CRISPR, POPULAR MECHANICS (Jan. 26, 2016), http://www.popular
mechanics.com/science/a19067/11-crazy-things-we-can-do-with-crispr-cas9/.
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